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Abstract
Between 1994 and 2004, New York State voters returned a Republican governor but always
cast a majority of the popular vote in favor of the Democratic candidate in the presidential
election. This paper exploits those elections in an effort to understand voters’ motivations to
switch party allegiances from presidential to gubernatorial elections. We argue that voters are
likely to switch political allegiances between gubernatorial and presidential elections because
they understand that the purpose of these elections is different. Using individual-level data,
we find that low-income individuals are the main source of the switch in the vote.
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1. Introduction 
 
Studies that analyze the voters’ motivation to vote for representatives from different parties 
in local and national elections, e.g. Atkeson and Partin (1995), Carsey and Wright (1998), 
Alesina and Rosenthal (1995), Beck et al. (1992), have usually focused on the macroeconomic 
circumstances which are more propitious to vote switching
 1. They have not, however, discussed 
which voters are more likely to be influenced by these macroeconomic conditions so as to 
actually switch party allegiance between elections.  
 
This paper investigates which group of voters is the most likely to forsake party allegiance 
between local and national elections. Focusing on the gubernatorial and presidential elections in 
New York State, we try to understand the motivations of New York State voters to elect a 
Republican governor after twenty years of Democratic leadership, while continuing to vote for 
the Democratic candidates in presidential elections.  
 
Our choice of New York State is motivated on two grounds. First, by focusing on one state, 
we can exclude differences in macroeconomic conditions between different states as the cause of 
split-ticket voting. Second, in New York State, the voters’ motivation to elect a Republican 
governor in a predominantly Democratic state could not have stemmed from their willingness to 
stop cronyism, as was the case in Massachusetts between 1990 and 2002 (see Fiorina, 1992). 
 
In New York State, registered Democrat voters have long outnumbered Republicans. As of 
November 2006, the ratio of Democrats to Republicans was 7 to 4 in the state, with the 
difference being entirely due to New York City, where the ratio was 5 to 1. It is therefore not 
surprising that Democratic candidates have carried New York State in every presidential election 
since 1988. However, little-known Republican candidate George Pataki was elected in 1994 to 
the governorship, defeating the incumbent Democratic governor, Mario Cuomo, only to be 
reelected twice, in 1998 and 2002, with comfortable margins.
2  
 
Using probit and multinomial logit regressions on individual-level data, we find that low-
income individuals are the individuals who are most likely to split their vote between national 
and local elections, as they vote Democratic for president but not for governor. We argue that 
this is because this group of voters benefits from the redistribution policies offered by the 
Democrats and the Republicans when they are elected: public-financed transfers at the national 
level and a tough approach to crime at the local level.  
 
                                                 
 
1 See Chari et al. (1997), Fiorina (1992) and Burden and Kimball (2002) on the vote differences in U.S. national 
elections, i.e., between presidential and congressional elections. See also Shachar (2003) and Degan (2007) on vote 
switching in consecutive presidential elections. 
2 Pataki’s victories were matched by those of Republican politician Rudolf Giuliani, whom New York City voters 
elected and then returned as mayor. They then elected and returned another Republican, Michael Bloomberg, to the 
same office. Pataki decided not to run for governor in 2006, and a Democrat, Elliot Spitzer, was elected. Spitzer was 
very popular as an Attorney General for the state, and his Republican opponent, John Faso, was largely unknown, so 
that the election was a foregone conclusion.   2
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the data used in this study. 




This paper employs individual-level data in the form of general election exit polls 
conducted by Voter News Service (VNS) in 1994 and 1998 in New York State.
3 In both years, 
VNS asked voters whom they selected for governor, as well as whom they had voted for 
president in the previous presidential election. Both polls also included questions on the 
respondent’s age, race/ethnicity, income level, and gender. From the questions, we generate 
indicators that take a value of 1 if the individual belongs to a particular category and zero 
otherwise, which we include as explanatory variables in this study. Summary statistics are shown 
in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
3. Empirical methodology 
 
To assess the determinants of the vote when using individual-level data, we estimate both 
a probit and a multinomial logit model due to the discrete nature of the dependent variable. The 
probit model, which estimates the probability that individual i will vote for the Democratic 
candidate in the gubernatorial election, is given by 
 
yi







election   ial gubernator   in the   candidate   Democratic   for the    votes   individual   if   1
election   ial gubernator   in the   candidate   Republican   for the    votes   individual   if   0 *
i
i
yi  (2) 
 
and where dempresi indicates whether individual i voted for the Democratic candidate in the 
previous presidential election;  Xi is a vector of individual i’s characteristics;dempresi * Xi is the 
interaction between the presidential election indicator and each of the individual i’s 
characteristics; and εi is the heteroskedasticity-consistent error term, clustered at the precinct 
level.  
 
As a robustness check on the probit regression results, we further analyze the 
gubernatorial vote by examining whether the individual voted for the Democratic, the 
Republican, the Independent, or the other minor party candidates.
4 Because these choices belong 
                                                 
3 We do not use the 2002 poll, which asked similar questions as the 1994 and 1998 polls, because only the national 
sample is available for that year. 
4 In 1994, the VNS poll options for the question “in today’s election for Governor, did you just vote for” included 
Mario Cuomo (Democrat/Liberal), George E. Pataki (Republican/Conservative), Robert T. Walsh, Sr. (Right to 
Life), Thomas Golisano (Independent), other, and did not vote for Governor. We thus combined votes for Walsh 
with votes classified under “Other.” In the 1998 poll, the options for Governor were Peter F. Vallone (Democrat), 
George E. Pataki (Republican/Conservative), Tom Gollisano (Independent), Betsy McCaughey Ross (Liberal), 
Other, and Did not vote for Governor. In this case, we combined votes for Ross with votes classified under “other.”   3
to unordered categories, we use a multinomial logit (MNL) model which estimates how 
individual  i’s characteristics  Xi affect his vote. For this purpose, we define the response 
probability Prob governori = j Xi ()  where  
 
j =
    0 for the Republican candidate in the gubernatorial election
     1 for the Democratic candidate in the gubernatorial election 
        2  for the Independent candidate in the gubernatorial election 









The probability that an individual i will select gubernatorial candidate j is given by 
 
Prob governori = j Xi () =
exp ′ βjXi ( )




       ( 3 )  
with j=1,2,3 and 
Prob governori = 0 Xi () =
1




       ( 4 )  
where  Xi is the vector of individual i’s characteristics. Since probabilities must sum to unity, 
Prob governori = 0 Xi () , which is the probability of a vote for the omitted category, is 
determined once the probabilities for the other categories are determined (Wooldridge, 2002).  
 
A restriction of the MNL model is that it relies on the irrelevant alternative assumption 
(IIA), which requires that the relative probabilities for any two alternatives are not modified if 
another alternative is added or if the characteristics of the third alternative are changed. The IIA 
can be tested using the McFadden-Haussman test (Wooldridge, 2002). 
 
Finally, because coefficients on multinomial logit models are difficult to interpret, we 
also report the marginal effects of changes in the regressors, evaluated at the mean of the 
respective explanatory variables. These marginal effects are meant to provide the response 




This section discusses our regression results. Table 2 present probit and multinomial results 
in regressions where we pooled the 1994 and 1998 election results, while Table 3 shows the 
marginal effects from the multinomial logit estimation. The IIA is tested for the MNL 
regressions and is found to hold.  
[Insert Table 2] [Insert Table 3] 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
We do not include Tom Gollisano in the “Other” category because in both elections he won the third highest share 
of the vote and was thus a prominent third party candidate in both elections.   4
Table 3 shows that those over 65 years old are more likely to vote Democrat for governor, 
regardless of who they voted for president. Young people, on the other hand, are found not to 
vote for the Democratic gubernatorial candidate.  
In addition, Table 2 indicates that Blacks who voted Democratic in the previous 
presidential election do not have a significant impact on the vote for the Democratic 
gubernatorial candidate. However, when examining the marginal effects in Table 3, it is seen that 
Blacks vote for the Democratic gubernatorial candidate, regardless of whether they voted 
Republican or Democrat in the previous presidential election. The same is true of Hispanics.  
 
As for income, the data suggest that low income people who voted Democratic for 
president switch since they vote Republican in the gubernatorial elections. In Table 2, it is seen 
that individuals who voted for the Democratic presidential candidate are less likely to vote for 
the Democratic than the Republican gubernatorial candidate, while in Table 3, it is seen that 
these individuals vote for the Republican candidate in the gubernatorial elections. Other income 
categories are mostly insignificant. This suggests that the voting pattern of individuals with low 
income explains Pataki’s victories in predominantly Democratic New York State.  
 
Two explanations of their behavior may be given. First, the platforms of the Republican 
and Democratic parties may lead voters from different income groups to switch their voting 
pattern. Second, voters are likely to switch political allegiances between gubernatorial and 
presidential elections because they understand that the purpose of these elections is different. 
Gubernatorial elections mainly focus on the redistribution of local taxes, and do not tackle major 
ideological issues, unlike presidential elections. Therefore, low income individuals may care less 
about redistribution policies at the state level than about local issues such as crime. In other 
words, a cause for the change in the voting pattern stems from the relative importance of 




Using individual data on New York State gubernatorial and presidential elections, this 
paper shows that low income individuals who voted for the Democratic presidential candidate do 
not vote for the Democratic gubernatorial candidate, and in fact vote Republican. It also suggests 
that voters understand the different purposes of elections at the local and national level, and 
hence are more likely to base their vote on expected policy outcome than on party platforms.    5
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 Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std Dev 
Democratic Governor  2279  0.467 0.025 
Democratic president  2279  0.628 0.023 
Black   2279  0.102 0.020 
Hispanic   2279  0.058 0.019 
Asian   2279  0.014 0.004 
Age 18-24  2279  0.528 0.049 
Age >65  2279  0.090 0.014 
Income <$15K  2279  0.075 0.010 
Income $15K-30K  2279  0.161 0.015 
Income $30K-50K  2279  0.236 0.013 
Income $50K-75K  2279  0.245 0.013 
Income $75K-100K  2279  0.118 0.011 
Females  2279  0.513 0.012 
 
Notes:  
• Unit of observation is the individual voter.  
• Data sources are VNS exit polls conducted in 1994 and 1998, ICPSR studies # 6520 and 2780, respectively.   7
Table 2. The vote in the gubernatorial elections 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   Democrat Independent Other  
 Probit  Multinomial  Logit 
Democratic President  1.694***  2.663***  0.326  0.841 
 (0.296)  (0.334)  (0.482)  (0.844) 
Black 0.525  1.918***  0.792*  -0.035 
 (0.490)  (0.364)  (0.433)  (1.047) 
Dempres*Black 0.844  0.519  -2.175*  2.263* 
 (0.517)  (0.465)  (1.096)  (1.177) 
Hispanic -0.077  1.460***  -0.413  0.046 
 (0.455)  (0.494)  (0.597)  (0.811) 
Dempres*Hispanic 0.909**  -0.020  0.084  -0.302 
 (0.441)  (0.463)  (0.870)  (1.397) 
Asian 0.428  1.517***  0.591  -20.309*** 
 (0.304)  (0.530)  (0.745)  (1.117) 
Dempres*Asian 0.058  -0.677  -32.616***  21.285 
 (0.487)  (0.657)  (0.852)  (0.000) 
Age 18-24  -0.730***  -0.339  0.275  1.106*** 
 (0.162)  (0.234)  (0.428)  (0.409) 
Dempres*Age 18-24  0.308  -0.377  0.362  -0.023 
 (0.194)  (0.275)  (0.317)  (0.660) 
Age > 65  0.517***  0.651**  -0.726  1.076 
 (0.166)  (0.304)  (0.759)  (1.069) 
Dempres*Age > 65  -0.106  0.059  0.424  -31.912*** 
 (0.256)  (0.443)  (0.649)  (1.537) 
Income <$15K  -0.137  0.156  -0.351  -0.062 
 (0.331)  (0.334)  (0.640)  (0.787) 
Dempres*Income <$15K  -0.661**  -1.421***  0.279  -1.032 
 (0.324)  (0.386)  (0.998)  (0.875) 
Income $15-30K  -0.227  -0.454  -0.068  0.630 
 (0.354)  (0.389)  (0.420)  (0.524) 
Dempres* Income $15-30K  -0.361  -0.515  0.061  -0.676 
 (0.368)  (0.435)  (0.465)  (0.808) 
Income $30-50K  -0.161  -0.611  -0.631  -0.621 
 (0.292)  (0.370)  (0.400)  (0.433) 
Dempres* Income $30-50K  -0.345  -0.241  0.495  0.339 
 (0.287)  (0.389)  (0.440)  (0.728) 
Income $50-75K  -0.202  -0.575*  -0.116  -0.664 
 (0.303)  (0.337)  (0.350)  (0.515) 
Dempres* Income $50-75K  -0.245  -0.165  0.195  0.023 
 (0.304)  (0.362)  (0.439)  (0.679) 
Income $75-100K  0.007  -0.193  0.358  0.266 
 (0.306)  (0.352)  (0.385)  (0.636) 
Dempres* Income $75-100K  -0.458  -0.538  -0.376  -0.186   8
 (0.322)  (0.409)  (0.504)  (0.814) 
Females -0.086  0.123  -0.392**  0.632 
 (0.141)  (0.153)  (0.170)  (0.386) 
Dempres*Females 0.059  -0.164  0.019  -0.115 
 (0.157)  (0.194)  (0.282)  (0.568) 
Observations 2279  3335  3335  3335 
F-statistic 24.5204       
Prob F  0.0000       
Percent correctly predicted  75.87  60.90     
Notes:  
• In column 1, the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 if the individual voted Democrat and 0 if the 
individual voted Republican, whereas in columns 2, 3, and 4, the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 0 if 
the individual voted Republican, 1 if Democrat, 2 if Independent, and 3 if Other. The omitted category is 
Republican. Individual data are for 1994 and 1998. 
• All regressions include county and year-fixed effects and are weighted by the total number of votes cast. Column 1 
presents probit estimates, with regressions estimated using Stata’s survey command. In columns 2, 3 and 4, 
multinomial results are shown. Those regressions were also estimated using Stata’s survey command, with 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering at the precinct level.  
• * denotes significance at the 10-percent level; ** at the 5- percent level; and *** at the 1-percent level.    9
Table 3. The vote in the gubernatorial elections: marginal effects in the multinomial logit model 
  Democrat  Republican  Independent Other 
Democratic President  0.556***  -0.522***  -0.0326  -0.00175 
  (0.054)  (0.055)  (0.022)  (0.0059) 
Black 0.422***  -0.401***  -0.0140  -0.00614 
 (0.067)  (0.058)  (0.018)  (0.0038) 
Dempres*Black 0.123  -0.116  -0.0543***  0.0477 
 (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.0100)  (0.056) 
Hispanic 0.353***  -0.312***  -0.0372***  -0.00448 
 (0.100)  (0.095)  (0.013)  (0.0038) 
Dempres*Hispanic -0.00557  0.00300  0.00475  -0.00218 
 (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.042)  (0.0086) 
Asian 0.348***  -0.325***  -0.0119  -0.0115*** 
 (0.10)  (0.095)  (0.028)  (0.0018) 
Dempres*Asian -0.378***  -0.553***  -0.0623***  0.993*** 
 (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.010)  (0.0022) 
Age 18-29  -0.0888  0.0601  0.0189  0.00980*** 
 (0.055)  (0.053)  (0.019)  (0.0033) 
Dempres*Age 18-29  -0.0939  0.0661  0.0270  0.000789 
 (0.060)  (0.059)  (0.020)  (0.0056) 
Age > 60  0.165**  -0.140*  -0.0345***  0.00957 
 (0.072)  (0.073)  (0.012)  (0.018) 
Dempres*Age > 60  0.0138  -0.0123  0.0243  -0.0258*** 
 (0.099)  (0.11)  (0.039)  (0.0046) 
Income <$15K  0.0436  -0.0256  -0.0171  -0.000874 
 (0.079)  (0.080)  (0.022)  (0.0060) 
Dempres*Income <$15K  -0.261***  0.223**  0.0422  -0.00427 
 (0.044)  (0.089)  (0.081)  (0.0041) 
Income $15-30K  -0.104  0.0903  0.00445  0.00875 
 (0.081)  (0.080)  (0.021)  (0.0077) 
Dempres* Income $15-30K  -0.113  0.104  0.0131  -0.00347 
 (0.088)  (0.084)  (0.028)  (0.0045) 
Income $30-50K  -0.126  0.146*  -0.0176  -0.00285 
 (0.078)  (0.077)  (0.016)  (0.0030) 
Dempres* Income $30-50K  -0.0673  0.0288  0.0347  0.00383 
 (0.083)  (0.082)  (0.031)  (0.0082) 
Income $50-75K  -0.126*  0.124*  0.00492  -0.00339 
 (0.070)  (0.071)  (0.016)  (0.0036) 
Dempres* Income $50-75K  -0.0422  0.0280  0.0136  0.000625 
 (0.082)  (0.076)  (0.026)  (0.0061) 
Income $75-100K  -0.0529  0.0260  0.0240  0.00296 
 (0.076)  (0.077)  (0.025)  (0.0066) 
Dempres* Income $75-100K  -0.112  0.120  -0.00840  0.0000912 
 (0.080)  (0.083)  (0.020)  (0.0068) 
Females 0.0345  -0.0179  -0.0217**  0.00510   10
 (0.036)  (0.034)  (0.0083)  (0.0034) 
Dempres*Females -0.0383  0.0346  0.00414  -0.000444 
  (0.043)  (0.045)  (0.013)  (0.0046) 
Observations  3335     
Notes:  
• Estimates are marginal effects, evaluated at the mean of each variable, from the multinomial logit regression 
presented in Table 2.  
• In 1994, the Democratic candidate for governor was Mario Cuomo; the Republican George Pataki; the 
Independent Tom Gollisano; and Other includes votes for candidates from remaining third parties. In 1998, the 
Democratic candidate for governor was Peter Vallone; the Republican George Pataki; the Independent Tom 
Gollisano; and Other again includes the votes for candidates from the remaining third parties. 
• * denotes significance at the 10-percent level; ** at the 5- percent level; and *** at the 1-percent level.  
 